Berghuis v. Thompkins
| Berghuis v. Thompkins | |
|---|---|
| Argued March 1, 2010 Decided June 1, 2010 | |
| Full case name | Mary Berghuis, Warden v. Van Chester Thompkins |
| Docket no. | 08-1470 |
| Citations | 560 U.S. 370 (more) 130 S. Ct. 2250; 176 L. Ed. 2d 1098 |
| Argument | Oral argument |
| Case history | |
| Prior | Defendant convicted; aff'd, Mich. Ct. App., February 3, 2004 (per curiam, unpublished); review denied, 683 N.W.2d 676 (Mich. 2004); petition denied, E.D. Mich.; rev'd, 547 F.3d 572 (6th Cir. 2008); cert. granted, 557 U.S. 965 (2009). |
| Holding | |
| A suspect's silence during interrogation does not invoke their right to remain silent under Miranda v. Arizona. The invocation of that right must be unambiguous, and silence is not enough to invoke it. Voluntarily and knowingly responding to police interrogation after remaining silent constitutes a waiver of the right to remain silent, provided that a Miranda warning was given and the suspect understood it. Sixth Circuit reversed and remanded. | |
| Court membership | |
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| Case opinions | |
| Majority | Kennedy, joined by Roberts, Scalia, Thomas, Alito |
| Dissent | Sotomayor, joined by Stevens, Ginsburg, Breyer |
| Laws applied | |
| U.S. Const. amends. V, VI | |
Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370 (2010), is a landmark decision by the Supreme Court of the United States in which the Court held that, unless and until a criminal suspect explicitly states that they are relying on their right to remain silent, their voluntary statements may be used in court and police may continue to question them. The mere act of remaining silent is not sufficient to imply the suspect has invoked their rights even when the suspect actually intended their silence to have that effect. Furthermore, a voluntary reply even after lengthy silence can be construed as waiving the right to remain silent.
The Court was split, 5–4. The dissent, authored by Justice Sonia Sotomayor, argued that Miranda v. Arizona and other previous cases had required the waiver of a constitutional right to be much clearer, especially because of the "compelling influence" that an interrogation causes after police have spent several hours pressuring a suspect.
Many considered Berghuis the latest in a line of cases eroding Miranda, perhaps "turning the clocks back" on safeguards for people being investigated by the police. At least one scholar argued that Berghuis effectively gutted Miranda. The opinion is commonly criticized as giving police permission to compromise vulnerable citizens in interrogation and, in effect, making it easier for the police to work around the theoretical existence of those citizens' rights.