Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel

Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel
Argued March 4, 1998
Decided June 25, 1998
Full case nameEastern Enterprises, Petitioner v. Kenneth S. Apfel, Commissioner of Social Security, et al.
Citations524 U.S. 498 (more)
118 S. Ct. 2131; 141 L. Ed. 2d 451; 1998 U.S. LEXIS 4213; 66 U.S.L.W. 4566; 22 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) 1225; 98 Cal. Daily Op. Service 5036; 98 Daily Journal DAR 6937; 1998 Colo. J. C.A.R. 3281; 11 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. S 755
Case history
PriorEastern Enterprises v. Chater, 110 F.3d 150 (1st Cir. 1997).
Holding
Whether a regulatory act constitutes a taking requiring compensation depends on the extent of diminution in the value of the property.
Court membership
Chief Justice
William Rehnquist
Associate Justices
John P. Stevens · Sandra Day O'Connor
Antonin Scalia · Anthony Kennedy
David Souter · Clarence Thomas
Ruth Bader Ginsburg · Stephen Breyer
Case opinions
PluralityO'Connor, joined by Rehnquist, Scalia, Thomas
ConcurrenceThomas
Concur/dissentKennedy
DissentStevens, joined by Souter, Ginsburg, Breyer
DissentBreyer, joined by Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg
Laws applied
U.S. Const. amends. V, XIV; Coal Industry Retiree Health Benefit Act of 1992

Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498 (1998), is a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court held that the Coal Industry Retiree Health Benefit Act (Coal Act) constituted an unconstitutional regulatory taking of property which required the Act to be invalidated. The import of this decision is that it was made in the context of a purely economic regulation. The plurality examines the statute and its resultant harm as an ad hoc factual inquiry based on factors delineated in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, such as the economic impact of the regulation, its interference with reasonable investment backed expectations, and the character of the governmental action. The decision thereby moved beyond the traditional notions of equal protection which had been applied to economic regulation since the time of Lochner v. New York, requiring extreme deference to Congress, and applied a regulatory takings analysis to the problem resulting in a much less deferential result. While the plurality recognizes that this is not a traditional takings case where the government appropriates private property for public use, they also state this is the type of case where the "Armstrong Principle" of preventing the government from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole. However, while the plurality seems to invalidate this particular law on takings grounds, the concurrences and the dissents warn of such an analysis as this should actually be examined under substantive due process or ex post facto theories.