United States support for Iraq during the Iran–Iraq War

During the Iran–Iraq War, which began with the Iraqi invasion of Iran on 22 September 1980, the United States adopted a policy of providing support to Iraq in the form of several billion dollars' worth of economic aid, dual-use technology, intelligence sharing (e.g., IMINT), and special operations training. This U.S. support, along with support from most of the Arab world, proved vital in helping Iraq sustain military operations against Iran. The documented sale of dual-use technology, with one notable example being Iraq's acquisition of 45 Bell helicopters in 1985, was effectively a workaround for a ban on direct arms transfers; U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East dictated that Iraq was a state sponsor of terrorism because of the Iraqi government's historical ties with groups like the Palestinian Liberation Front and the Abu Nidal Organization, among others. However, this designation was removed in 1982 to facilitate broader support for the Iraqis as the conflict dragged on in Iran's favour. Of particular interest for contemporary Iran–United States relations is a conspiracy theory alleging that the U.S. government actively encouraged Iraqi president Saddam Hussein to invade Iran following the Islamic Revolution. Proponents of this theory, particularly in the Arab world, assert that there is evidence of the U.S. government having greenlit Saddam's intention to launch the campaign, but no direct documentary proof of such a collusion has been found, and several scholars and American officials have denied that such collaboration was in play prior to the conflict.

U.S. support for Iraq was not covert, especially during the Reagan administration, and was frequently the subject of open sessions in the Senate and the House of Representatives. On June 9, 1992, British-American journalist Ted Koppel reported on ABC News Nightline that the "Reagan/Bush administrations permitted—and frequently encouraged—the flow of money, agricultural credits, dual-use technology, chemicals, and weapons to Iraq." The decision by the U.S. and the Western Bloc to openly oppose Iran was made less complicated by the fact that the Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc had also adopted the same position, with both sides seeking to contain the Iranian policy of exporting the Islamic Revolution; Iran's new government, led by Ruhollah Khomeini, had antagonized the Americans and the Soviets (the "Great Satan" and the "Lesser Satan") as part of an effort to mobilize Shia Islamism throughout the Muslim world. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, more than 90% of Iraqi arms imports during the Iran–Iraq War came from the Soviet Union, France, and China.

Despite the U.S. government's official position, the view of American officials on the conflict was geared towards simply preventing an Iranian victory rather than being enthusiastically supportive of Iraq's ambitions, as encapsulated in a remark by American diplomat Henry Kissinger that "It's a pity they both can't lose." On 20 August 1988, the Iran–Iraq War came to an end by the belligerents' acceptance of United Nations Security Council Resolution 598, which stipulated their return to the status quo of the 1975 Algiers Agreement. The result of the conflict was ultimately inconclusive, though both sides claimed victory; Iraq's drained human and financial resources, including national debt to other countries, would go on to serve as one of the bases for the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990. As part of the ensuing Gulf War, the U.S. re-designated the country as a state sponsor of terrorism and led a 42-country United Nations coalition to end the Iraqi occupation by force. International sanctions against Iraq, which were first imposed during the Kuwaiti campaign, continued until the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq.