Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses

Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses (SEAD /ˈs-æd/), also known in the United States as "Wild Weasel" and (initially) "Iron Hand" operations, are military actions to suppress enemy surface-based air defenses, including surface-to-air missiles (SAMs), anti-aircraft artillery (AAA), and related systems such as early-warning radar and command, control and communication functions.

Suppression can be accomplished by physically destroying the systems or by disrupting and deceiving them through electronic warfare. In modern warfare, SEAD missions can constitute up to 30% of sorties launched in the first week of combat and continue at a reduced rate through the rest of a campaign. One-quarter of American combat sorties in recent conflicts have been SEAD missions. They are generally associated with aircraft, but may be performed using any means, including ground forces.

In some contexts, Destruction of Enemy Air Defenses (DEAD) refers to physical destruction of air defense targets, while SEAD applies to sorties which discourage enemy use of air-defense radar assets out of fear of placing the assets in jeopardy.

Primitive operations akin to SEAD emerged during the Second World War: efforts to degrade enemy ground radar stations. The Vietnam War saw the first SEAD missions performed by dedicated aircraft. Other early conflicts with SEAD efforts included the 1982 Falklands War, over Port Stanley, and the 1982 Lebanon War, in the Beqaa Valley. The 1990s saw extensive use of SEAD, particularly during the Gulf War. In the 1999 NATO bombing of Yugoslavia, air defenses proved less vulnerable and more effective; the downing of an F-117A Nighthawk marked the first combat loss of a stealth aircraft. In the Iraq War of the 2000s, coalition aircraft targeted Iraqi SAMs during the opening phase of the conflict, yet aerial strikes were usually performed from stand-off distances to avoid these defenses, and low-level flight was avoided. In the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine, while many Ukrainian air defence facilities were reportedly destroyed or damaged in the first days of the war by Russian air strikes, Russia may not have been able to gain aerial superiority; it has been alleged that Ukrainian mid-range SAM sites have forced planes to fly low, but this makes them vulnerable to shoulder-launched surface-to-air missiles.