Schweinfurt–Regensburg mission

Schweinfurt-Regensburg mission
Part of Operation Pointblank

1st Bomb Wing B-17s over Schweinfurt, Germany
DateAugust 17, 1943
Location
Schweinfurt and Regensburg, Germany
Result German victory
Belligerents
 United States
 United Kingdom
 Nazi Germany
Commanders and leaders
Curtis LeMay
Robert B. Williams
Adolf Galland
Units involved
Eighth Air Force
RAF Fighter Command
Luftwaffe
Strength
376 B-17 heavy bombers
268 P-47 fighter sorties
191 Spitfire fighter sorties
Approx. 400 Bf 109, Bf 110, Fw 190 and other fighters
Casualties and losses
60 bombers, 3 P-47s, and 2 Spitfires lost
58-95 bombers heavily damaged
7 aircrew KIA and 21 WIA aboard returning aircraft
557 aircrew MIA or POW
25–27 fighters
203 civilians killed

The Schweinfurt–Regensburg mission was a strategic bombing mission during World War II carried out by Boeing B-17 Flying Fortress heavy bombers of the US Army Air Forces on August 17, 1943. The mission was an ambitious plan to cripple the German aircraft industry; it was also known as the "double-strike mission" because it entailed two large forces of bombers attacking separate targets in order to disperse fighter reaction by the Luftwaffe. It was also the first American shuttle mission, in which all or part of a mission landed at a different field and later bombed another target before returning to its base.

After being postponed several times by unfavorable weather, the operation, known within the Eighth Air Force as "Mission No. 84", was flown on the anniversary of the first daylight raid by the Eighth Air Force.

Mission No. 84 was a strike by 376 bombers of 16 bomb groups against German heavy industry well beyond the range of escorting fighters. The mission inflicted heavy damage on the Regensburg target, but at catastrophic loss to the force, with 60 bombers lost and many more damaged beyond economical repair. As a result, the Eighth Air Force was unable to follow up immediately with a second attack that might have seriously crippled German industry. When Schweinfurt was attacked again two months later, the lack of long-range fighter escort had still not been addressed and losses were even higher. As a consequence, deep penetration strategic bombing was curtailed for five months.

As soon as the reconnaissance photographs were received on the evening of the 17th, Generals Eaker and Anderson knew that the Schweinfurt raid had been a failure. The excellent results at Regensburg were small consolation for the loss of 60 B-17s. The results of the bombing were exaggerated, and the high losses were well disguised in after-mission reports. Everyone who flew the mission stressed the importance of the escorts in reducing losses; the planners grasped only that Schweinfurt would have to be bombed again, soon, in another deep-penetration, unescorted mission.

Donald Caldwell