Cognitive closure (philosophy)

Cognitive closure refers to the concept in the philosophy of mind and philosophy of science that suggests human cognitive faculties are fundamentally incapable of solving certain philosophical problems. These problems, which have persisted throughout the history of philosophy, are considered beyond the reach of human understanding, not because of insufficient data or research, but due to inherent limits in the structure or capabilities of the mind.

Philosopher Colin McGinn, a proponent of cognitive closure, argues that certain philosophical problems, such as the mind–body problem, personal identity, the foundations of meaning, knowledge, both a priori and empirical, and free will, may be fundamentally unknowable by humans. He refers to this viewpoint as transcendental naturalism. Philosopher Owen Flanagan has referred to this stance as "anti-constructive naturalism" or "new mysterianism," and like McGinn, he posits that the limitations are intrinsic to the human brain’s design.