Turkish involvement in the Syrian civil war
| Turkish involvement in the Syrian civil war | |||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Part of foreign involvement in the Syrian civil war | |||||||||||
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| Belligerents | |||||||||||
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Supported by: |
Supported by:
PKK |
Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant Al-Nusra Front |
Syrian Arab Republic | ||||||||
| Commanders and leaders | |||||||||||
|
Recep Tayyip Erdoğan Salim Idris Abdurrahman Mustafa Albay Ahmed Berri Ebubekir Seyf Fahim Issa Ahmed Othman |
Hediya Yousef |
Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi † (Emir of al-Bab) Abu Hussein al-Tunusi † ISIL southern Raqqa field commander Abu Khalid Urduni † (Emir of al-Bab) Abu Ja'fr Dagestani † (ISIL emir) |
Bashar al-Assad Maher al-Assad Ali Abdullah Ayyoub | ||||||||
| Units involved | |||||||||||
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Free Syrian Army |
YPG | Unknown | National Defence Forces | ||||||||
| Strength | |||||||||||
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685,862 servicemen 668 aircraft | 65,000 | 31,500–100,000 militants (2016) |
178,000 servicemen 320 aircraft | ||||||||
| Casualties and losses | |||||||||||
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Turkey 299–361 servicemen killed Equipment
3,109 killed |
Syrian Democratic Forces 2,345 killed |
Islamic State Hayat Tahrir al-Sham Lions of the East Army 5 killed |
Equipment
Hezbollah 3 servicemen killed Equipment
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| 881–1,517 civilians killed by Turkish Armed Forces and border guards | |||||||||||
Turkey's involvement in the Syrian civil war began diplomatically and later escalated militarily. Initially, Turkey condemned the Syrian government at the outbreak of civil unrest in Syria during the spring of 2011; the Turkish government's involvement gradually evolved into military assistance for the Free Syrian Army in July 2011, border clashes in 2012, and direct military interventions in 2016–17, in 2018, in 2019, 2020, and in 2022. The military operations have resulted in the Turkish occupation of northern Syria since August 2016.
After a decade of relatively friendly relations with Syria from 2000 to 2010, Turkey condemned Syrian president Bashar al-Assad over the violent crackdown on protests in 2011 and later that year joined a number of other countries demanding his resignation. From the beginning of the war, Turkey trained defectors of the Syrian Army in its territory under the supervision of the Turkish National Intelligence Organisation (MİT), among whom emerged the Free Syrian Army (FSA) in July 2011. In May 2012, the Turkish National Intelligence Organisation (MİT) began arming and training the FSA and provided them with a base of operations. Furthermore, Turkey until 2016 had followed a ¨softer¨ approach to the Syrian Civil War by using more diplomatic means such as through international diplomacy and targeted sanctions. Tensions between Syria and Turkey significantly worsened after Syrian forces shot down a Turkish fighter jet in June 2012, and border clashes erupted in October 2012. On 24 August 2016, the Turkish Armed Forces began a direct military intervention into Syria by declaring Operation Euphrates Shield, mainly targeting the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant. It had also fulfilled other pre-existing Turkish policy goals such as in limiting the influx of the Refugees of the Syrian civil war.
Turkey has strongly supported Syrian dissidents. Syrian opposition activists convened in Istanbul in May 2011 to discuss regime change, and Turkey hosted the head of the Free Syrian Army, Colonel Riad al-Asaad. Turkey became increasingly hostile to the Assad government's policies and encouraged reconciliation among dissident factions. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan declared his intent to "cultivate a favorable relationship with whatever government would take the place of Assad." Turkey financed the National Coalition of Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces (also known as the Syrian National Coalition) and the Syrian Interim Government (SIG). In 2017, it facilitated the establishment of the SIG's armed forces, the Syrian National Army.
A study by Metropoll in September 2019 found that 68% of Turks disapprove of the current government policies on Syria. The poll also found that 47.5% of Turks see the Free Syrian Army as an "enemy". Three out of four Turks said that Syrian refugees should return to Syria "even if the war continues". According to another research by Metropoll, the amount of support for the 2019 Turkish offensive into north-eastern Syria was at 79%, while Operation Olive Branch had 71% support.
In the months leading up to the 2024 Syrian opposition offensives that led to the fall of the Assad regime in Syria, Turkey sought a reconciliation with Assad to mitigate the threat to Turkey from Kurdish militias and discuss the resettlement of Syrian refugees. The Assad regime insisted on the complete withdrawal of Turkish forces from Syria; a demand which was echoed by Russia in November 2024. On 27 November 2024, Syrian opposition forces launched an offensive against the Syrian regime, a move which analysts say would have been impossible without a green light from Turkey.
The Syrian rebels' quick progress against the Syrian regime paved the way for a renewed Turkish offensive against Kurdish forces. Beginning on 30 November 2024 with Operation Dawn of Freedom, the offensive aims to expand Turkish-controlled territory, weaken the SDF, prevent Kurdish autonomy in post-Assad Syria, and align with Turkish initiatives to establish a 30-kilometer deep buffer zone in northern Syria.