Kursk offensive (2024–2025)

Kursk offensive
Part of attacks in Russia during the Russian invasion of Ukraine

Claimed extent of Ukrainian-held areas as of 28 April 2025
Date6 August 2024 – March 2025
Location
Result See § Analysis
Territorial
changes
  • Russian forces regain control over most of the territory held by Ukraine in Kursk Oblast
  • Russian incursions into neighbouring Sumy Oblast
Belligerents
 Ukraine  Russia
 North Korea
Commanders and leaders
Oleksandr Syrskyi
Eduard Moskaliov
Pavlo Rozlach
Dmytro Voloshyn
Andrey Belousov
Valery Gerasimov
Yunus-Bek Yevkurov
Aleksey Dyumin
Alexander Bortnikov
Apti Alaudinov
Units involved
Order of battle Order of battle
Strength
Western estimate:
10,000–15,000 soldiers and 600 armored vehicles
(14 August 2024)
15,000–30,000 soldiers
(20 August 2024)

Per Ukraine:
50,000 soldiers
(5 November 2024)

Western estimate:
40,000 soldiers
(12 October 2024)
12,000 soldiers
Casualties and losses

Per OSINT:
c. 790 pieces of equipment

Per Russia:
74,000+ casualties
100 captured
2,915 pieces of equipment

Per OSINT:
c. 740 pieces of equipment

  • 66–80 tanks
  • 2 Ka-52 helicopters

115–247+ captured
Per Ukraine:
50,000+ losses (20,000 killed, 1,000 captured)
2,432 pieces of equipment, 931 tactical and strategic UAVs

Per Ukraine:
5,500–6,000 casualties, 2 captured
Per South Korea:
600 killed, 4,100 injured, 2 captured
Per Russia: 358 civilians killed, 503 injured and 789 civilians missing
144,000+ civilians evacuated (133,000+ evacuated in Kursk Oblast and 11,000+ evacuated in Belgorod Oblast)

On 6 August 2024, during the Russian invasion of Ukraine, part of the Russo-Ukrainian War, the Armed Forces of Ukraine launched an incursion into Russia's Kursk Oblast and clashed with the Russian Armed Forces and Russian border guard. A state of emergency was declared in Kursk Oblast, and Russian reserves were rushed to the area. By the end of the first week, the Ukrainian military said it had captured 1,000 km2 (390 sq mi) of Russian territory, while Russian authorities acknowledged that Ukraine had captured 28 settlements.

In the second half of August the front stabilized, and in early October, the Ukrainian advance had stalled. From November, North Korean forces were sent to the province to support the Russian military. By the end of that month, Russian forces recaptured around half of the territory Ukraine had occupied. By 11 March 2025, most of the Ukrainian forces appeared to have retreated as a result of a Russian counterattack. Russian troops entered Sudzha, around which a shrinking pocket of territory still controlled by Ukraine had formed, the next day.

Ukrainian officials said the goals of the operation included inflicting damage on Russia's military, capturing Russian troops, pushing Russian artillery further out of range, hindering Russian supply lines and diverting their forces from other fronts. It also aimed to put pressure on the Russian government and force it into "fair" peace negotiations. By the end of August, the operation began to be criticized for diverting Ukrainian forces from the east, stretching Ukraine's personnel along the front and allowing Russia to advance toward Pokrovsk. The Institute for the Study of War reported that Russia had moved forces from "lower-priority" areas, but not from Donetsk Oblast.

The Kursk offensive surprised Russia, some of Ukraine's allies, and many in the Ukrainian elite. It is the most significant attack across the border since the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine, and the first carried out primarily by Ukrainian regular forces. Earlier smaller incursions into Russia by pro-Ukrainian forces had taken place with Ukraine supporting them but denying explicit involvement.

Western analysts differed in their assessment of the outcome of the offensive, with defence researcher Marina Miron viewing it as a strategic failure for Ukraine, Markus Reisner taking the view that a correct assessment of the battle could only be given after the total withdrawal of Ukrainian forces from Kursk to determine the losses incurred, and former military advisor Nico Lange viewing it as a success. Land warfare expert Nick Reynolds said that Ukraine had held the Sudzha pocket for a "remarkable" amount of time, and that the Ukrainian offensive had had a "shaping effect on Russian thinking".