M23 campaign (2022–present)
| M23 campaign | |||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Part of the Kivu conflict and the Democratic Republic of the Congo–Rwanda conflict | |||||||||
Military situation as of 10 May 2025 Presence of Ugandan army forces
Presence of Burundi army forces
Presence of Wazalendo militias (DRC-aligned)
Tantalum, tungsten or tin mines | |||||||||
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| Belligerents | |||||||||
RED-Tabara (from Feb 2025) |
DR Congo
FDLR
| ||||||||
| Commanders and leaders | |||||||||
|
Bertrand Bisimwa Sultani Makenga (WIA) Yusuf Mboneza † (disputed) Léon Kanyamibwa |
Félix Tshisekedi Pacifique Masunzu Peter Cirimwami Nkuba † Clément Bitangalo Bulime Philémon Yav Irung Constant Ndima Kongba Muhindo Lwanzo Francois-Xavier Aba van Ang Jeff Mungai Nyagah Alphaxard Kiugu Gaston Iyamuremye Pacifique Ntawungukav Ezechiel Gakwerere (POW) | ||||||||
| Units involved | |||||||||
|
| ||||||||
| Strength | |||||||||
|
Rebels: 100–200+ (Mar 2022) 400+ (May 2022) 6,000+ (Jan 2025) Rwanda: c. 3,000–4,000 |
60,000 2,900 900+ 750 | ||||||||
| Casualties and losses | |||||||||
| Unknown |
1 helicopter shot down 1 helicopter shot down, 29 killed | ||||||||
| |||||||||
The M23 campaign is an ongoing series of military offensives launched by the March 23 Movement (M23), a Rwandan-backed rebel paramilitary group in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, since March 2022. In November 2021, M23 first launched attacks against the Congolese military (FARDC) and MONUSCO, seizing military positions in Ndiza, Cyanzu, and Runyoni in North Kivu Province. This coincided with the deployment of Uganda People's Defence Force (UPDF) to the region to combat the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), a Ugandan rebel group operating in the Congo's North Kivu and Ituri provinces.
The conflict escalated between March and June 2022, as M23 overran key areas in Rutshuru Territory, including the strategic border town of Bunagana, forcing Congolese soldiers to flee into Uganda. Uganda alleged that Rwanda orchestrated the offensive to undermine UPDF operations against the ADF, while Rwanda counterclaimed that Uganda was leveraging M23 elements to threaten its national security. The DRC accused Rwanda of provisioning armaments and reorganizing the insurgency, a claim substantiated by a United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Group of Experts report. Rwanda and M23, in turn, accused the DRC of collaborating with the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) and claimed their campaign aimed to protect Banyamulenge from FDLR aggression. A UNSC report noted that Rwandan military incursions into Congolese territory had begun prior to alleged FARDC-FDLR cooperation, with analysts posited that M23's resurgence was primarily driven by economic and commercial interests rather than ethno-political or security concerns.
The conflict drew regional involvement, leading the East African Community (EAC) to deploy the East African Community Regional Force (EACRF) to stabilize the situation. On 26 January 2023, M23 captured Kitchanga. Exasperated by the perceived inaction of the EACRF, the Congolese government sought military assistance from the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and established a reserve corps, which encouraged the formation of militias under the Wazalendo movement near M23-controlled areas. In June 2023, Human Rights Watch documented widespread human rights abuses by M23, including extrajudicial executions, sexual violence, and other war crimes, with allegations of Rwandan complicity. The UNSC subsequently called for sanctions against M23 leaders and implicated high-ranking Rwandan officials in the violence. By March 2024, M23 had launched further offensives, including a northern push into Rutshuru Territory, capturing Rwindi and the Vitshumbi fishery along Lake Edward. An April UNSC-commissioned report estimated that between 3,000 and 4,000 Rwandan Defence Force (RDF) troops were present in eastern DRC, surpassing the estimated 3,000 M23 combatants. In June 2024, M23 and RDF forces seized Kanyabayonga and Kirumba and entering Lubero Territory for the first time. Diplomatic efforts, led by Angolan President João Lourenço, faltered after President Paul Kagame failed to attend a tripartite summit in Luanda on 15 December, which was meant to address the FDLR issue alongside President Félix Tshisekedi and President Lourenço. Rwanda's absence fueled suspicions that its involvement in eastern DRC was driven primarily by economic interests, particularly access to Kivu's mineral resources, rather than security concerns.
Beginning in January 2025, M23 began making major advances towards Goma and Bukavu, the provincial capitals of North Kivu and South Kivu, with alleged Rwandan backing, intensifying growing tensions between the two nations. By 30 January, M23 had captured all of Goma and began an advance towards Bukavu, capturing the town by 16 February. Following the capture of Goma, M23 announced their intentions to march on Kinshasa.