Spoiler effect
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| Social choice and electoral systems |
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In social choice theory and politics, a spoiler effect happens when a losing candidate affects the results of an election simply by participating. Voting rules that are not affected by spoilers are said to be spoilerproof.
The frequency and severity of spoiler effects depends substantially on the voting method. Instant-runoff voting (IRV), the two-round system (TRS), and especially first-past-the-post (FPP) without winnowing or primary elections are highly sensitive to spoilers (though IRV and TRS less so in some circumstances), and all three rules are affected by center-squeeze and vote splitting. Majority-rule (or Condorcet) methods are only rarely affected by spoilers, which are limited to rare situations called cyclic ties. Rated voting systems are not subject to Arrow's theorem. Whether such methods are spoilerproof depends on the nature of the rating scales the voters use to express their opinions.
Spoiler effects can also occur in some methods of proportional representation, such as the single transferable vote (STV or RCV-PR) and the largest remainders method of party-list representation, where it is called a new party paradox. A new party entering an election causes some seats to shift from one unrelated party to another, even if the new party wins no seats. This kind of spoiler effect is avoided by divisor methods and proportional approval.: Thm.8.3