First Jassy–Kishinev offensive
| First Jassy–Kishinev offensive | |||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Part of Eastern Front, World War II | |||||||
Advance of the Red Army, 1943–1944 | |||||||
| |||||||
| Belligerents | |||||||
|
Romania Germany | Soviet Union | ||||||
| Commanders and leaders | |||||||
|
Petre Dumitrescu Otto Wöhler |
Ivan Konev Rodion Malinovsky | ||||||
| Strength | |||||||
| 300,000 | 830,000 | ||||||
| Casualties and losses | |||||||
| 45,000 casualties | 150,000 casualties | ||||||
The first Jassy–Kishinev offensive, named after the two major cities in the area, Jassy and Kishinev, was a series of military engagements between 8 April and 6 June 1944 (according to David Glantz) by the Soviet Union and Axis powers. Richard C. Hall also refers to a first Jassy–Kishinev operation which began on 5 April, without providing an exact date for its end. According to Glantz, the purported offensive was a coordinated invasion of Romania conducted by Red Army's 2nd and 3rd Ukrainian Fronts, in accordance with Joseph Stalin's strategy of projecting Soviet military power and political influence into the Balkans. However, according to the German Military History Research Office, a threatened Soviet offensive in northern Moldavia "failed to materialize" in the first part of April, and the military engagements during the rest of the month were used by the Axis forces to straighten the frontline; furthermore, on 6 May, the main command of the Soviet military (Stavka) issued orders to take no further offensive actions in this sector of the front.
Glantz claims that the plans of the Stavka envisioned the two Soviet fronts would cut off vital Axis defensive lines in northern Romania, facilitating a subsequent advance by the Red Army into the entire Balkan region. Glantz considers the Soviet attack commenced with the First Battle of Târgu Frumos and the Battle of Podu Iloaiei, and culminated with the Second Battle of Târgu Frumos. Soviet forces failed to overcome German defenses in the region and the offensive operation ultimately failed, mainly due to the poor combat performance of Soviet troops and the effectiveness of German defensive preparations. Conversely, according to the German Military History Research Office, the battles at Târgu Frumos were part of the Soviet offensive that had begun in March, and the Germans and Romanians profited from the bad weather conditions to obtain a defensive success.
Glantz claims this operation is part of a series of battles almost completely ignored by Soviet archival records and historiography: "During the almost 60 years since the end of World War II, Soviet and Russian military historians and theorists have carefully erased from the historical record any mention of the 2nd and 3rd Ukrainian Fronts' first Iasi–Kishinev offensive, during which the Red Army's two fronts attempted to invade Romania in April and May 1944. As is the case with so many other military operations the Red Army conducted during the war, they have done this deliberately, in the process relegating this offensive to a lengthy list of "forgotten battles" of the Soviet–German War."